Cohesix Audit Report (2026-09-13)
The subsequent 14 September DD30 retirement supersedes this report’s recurring DD30 approval and expiry requirements. The following release decisions and test results retain their original scope and dates.
Finding decision for 1.0.0-beta: DD26–29 CLOSED_VERIFIED; DD30 P1 / ACCEPTED_RISK under the explicit release-owner waiver EX-2026-0030. The DD30 dynamic fault/wake test remains unexecuted. The final Stage 05 verdict belongs to the dedicated release acceptance run on the final committed source, with both approved decisions explicitly selected and validated; this report does not substitute for that run. The approved carry-forward preserves the older Stage 01–04 identities and discloses the missing complete new-source chain.
Scope: Milestone 26e
m26e-driver-runtime-mcs-port-and-cyw43-coexistence, discovered during
m26e-mcs-smp-target-acceptance. The selected implementation tested for the
DD26 artifact check is 8c050a0aaf7b8d0d074e9fb12fc91ef45ae60b39.
The audit starts from clean 385d5fdc46c80d6fe1b590f4555ee3b0b0763954, whose
only change from that implementation is the cohsh Worker-script test fingerprint.
The post-burn-in update reviews source 719043fad and actual Pi implementation
61f7bcd1f. The final finding review below adds fresh WiFi evidence on that same
Pi image and the owner decision on reviewed source 6d7c16e4a. These updates
supersede the earlier outstanding-proof snapshots. The later host-only compatibility repair below changes no target runtime
implementation.
Evidence root and DD26 closure
All relative evidence paths below are under:
/Users/lukasbower/GitHub/cohesix/out/release-qualification/1.0.0-beta-8bc556850-20260909/continuation-a45a3d9cc-20260910T083610Z/stage5-closure-20260910T124827Z
Independent automated reviewer /root/review_tls_pcie_publication reviewed
the source, existing test receipts and emitted artifact independently of the
repair implementer. independent/tls-pcie-publication.json and its companion
Markdown report establish real AtomicUsize storage, C layout, alignment,
single-crate definition/accessors, Release/Acquire pointer publication, and
the unsafe accessor’s exclusive-image obligation. A zero-sized runtime
definition no longer exists. The stored pointer’s atomic publication does not
grant mutable ownership of its target.
The latest artifact refresh is
independent/pi4-ipc-owner-emitted-8c050a0aa-01/review.json; its exact image is
fe083489691a86129906e8ee64784ac7c680cbb92b2f2be6bb15a97da1861ca7, with SHA-256
c61c94b285f450730f259d76c295859418399b580c36a0266176dee47ac3230f.
The staged root is bound through the actual CPIO member, allocated sections
and load segments to the symbol-bearing ELF. Its single TLS object occupies
16 bytes at 0x924b00, aligned to 16, without writable-symbol overlap.
independent/pi4-8c050a0aa-artifact-review.json, SHA-256
57b0fd180f4c701a7d5caa7a4d9c6fc31ef1fad6517df83e15cf46762ad6bb24,
records the machine-readable artifact verdict.
The DD26 closure recommendation retains exact source-span comparisons and
rehashes 22 existing evidence files:
independent/dd26-scoped-closure-recommendation-385d5fdc4-01/review.json, SHA-256
0195de2918cdd52fc33d07cb44a3a64d5ee6493c270c4335c5af48e36cb2357a.
Reproduction commands for the original artifact and emitted-code checks are
retained in the exact Pi artifact review’s verification_commands; the checked scripts are
verify_pi_artifact.py and verify_pi_emission.py beside that report.
Existing tls_storage_tests::exported_tls_word_has_storage_and_c_layout
receipts and independent extracted-layout checks are reused without rerunning
Stages 01–04. These establish the scoped defect closure. Historical physical
fault attribution remains unproved, and any subsequently selected image still
requires its own layout check.
Renewal and retained validation
Lukas Bower explicitly renewed EX20–23 through 2026-10-13. Approval is retained
in continuation-20260912T212227Z/exception-renewal-approval.json, SHA-256
497578be08681f923979e6aa397c9a6be649fca6fb99cc10b23b6671a24e1159.
Commit 724580aa62a848a8356159b9a7f0f86d23993c78 applied the reviewed scopes and
dates. validation/exception-renewal-apply-01/result.json records the passing
exception-register, generated-contract and Test Plan checks. P1 conditions
and compensating controls remain binding.
validation/qemu-stage5-closure-22e3d08ffb5d-01/SUMMARY.md preserves exact
Stages 01–04 PASS. Its original Stage 05 failure and subsequent collect-all
diagnostic remain unchanged. Later focused evidence includes
validation/qemu-worker-convergence-8c050a0aa-01 (ordinary Worker lifecycle
PASS), validation/native-base-tcp-8c050a0aa-01 (Jetson KVM base matrix and ten
scripts PASS), and the scoped IPC tests/source/emitted reviews. The KVM guest
was cross-built on the Mac; its client was built natively on Linux AArch64.
None of these results relabels a predecessor attestation.
The failed 8c050 broad-run attempt is also preserved. Its Worker-script
fingerprint mismatch was corrected in 385d5fdc4; all six focused catalogue
tests passed in validation/worker-script-catalog-01. The user directed that
Stages 01–04 not be retraced unless absolutely necessary. At this earlier
snapshot no new full plan had been launched. The later failed attempt and
explicit carry-forward approval are recorded below.
Earlier outstanding-proof snapshot (before completed burn-in repairs)
DD27 requires fresh candidate root-text/console evidence. DD28 requires
complete retained PCIe observations and WiFi/GENET boot/network proof. DD29
requires the actual repaired-image keyboard-present and keyboard-absent
machine cases. The Pi currently needs physical recovery to observed U-Boot:
continuation-20260912T212227Z/serial-intake-05/result.json records ten seconds
with zero received or transmitted bytes. No candidate boot is inferred.
Human observations are assumed PASS as instructed, separately from missing
machine records.
DD30 still needs the required exact QEMU/Pi fault/wake evidence.
validation/qemu-ipc-owner-gdb-3746e659f-01/stop-report.json, SHA-256
ddd6cffd321fcfcbe02f760f62dde295bbf0f6061428c92944778492789e7cc2,
preserves the diagnostic stopped by automated cybersecurity review before
fault injection or error/retry execution. It was not retried. Debugger
capability preflight and ordinary lifecycle PASS do not satisfy this gap.
Fresh Pi acceptance, pressure/repeatability, SD delivery/readback and normal boot, extracted release-bundle verification, human review of new Rust, and promotion remain separate requirements. No merge, push or release occurred. These statements describe that earlier snapshot, not the post-burn-in state below.
Earlier post-burn-in closure review (before DD28 proof and DD30 owner decision)
Title/ID: stage5-post-burn-in-evidence-closure. Milestone and discovery task
remain the M26e tasks named above. The goal is to close only findings whose
missing evidence is now available, preserving completed Stages 01–04 and burn-in.
The clean main source reviewed is
719043fadc26cf9ac5e826ea68c65d45b49b750f. Its final change after tested Pi source
61f7bcd1f057277151b46e884339076a7e49bb59 affects only host evidence timeline
parsing/tests and documentation; the reviewed Pi implementation is unchanged.
The burn-in evidence root is
out/burn-in/20260913T002623Z/budget-8m-20260913T0637Z in the main checkout.
CURRENT.md, RUN_RECORD.md and REVIEW.md record the completed focused
repairs and previously uncovered tools. The original timed maintenance failure
after 86 minutes and 43 jobs remains unchanged. Subsequent maintenance refusals,
containment, QUIESCED, both FUSE remounts and resumed CUDA/PEFT work passed.
No full burn-in or completed stage was repeated for this review. The Pi was
last observed ONLINE with empty active leases; the earlier recovery requirement
is superseded by the actual successful boot and workload evidence.
DD27: first-publication/address defect closed
Independent automated reviewer /root/review_tls_pcie_publication recommends
CLOSED_VERIFIED in
independent/dd27-burn-in-evidence-review-719043fad-01/review.json, SHA-256
73676bd5c769532c4ef17ac530c9f8e19576cd5d32cba9c1753d602aac1b4c2b.
Its verify_existing_evidence.py independently extracts the sealed root ELF
from the actual Pi image, SHA-256
5f3457c2a0798ec28bca7f7511b90e8eeb7eb628f43844823939d3661a9aacbf, image ID
9643bd91cf1cb7a071d5d2525f2b58ca50695e70088b4b000dbf01b8f034c6cc.
All eight acquired root-text cuts match actual ELF FNV-1a32 0x0001c885 and
word34 0x91002100 in order. The capture-time, pre-PCIe receipt is complete
and no audit-capture failure is present. Image/RAM CRC, exact serial BUILD and
the raw-result boot-log hash bind that boot; the host pack manifest is not
misrepresented as a Pi image identity.
The raw workload completed 1024 unpaced requests on one connection without retry/reconnect at 670.726 requests/s and p95 4.595 ms. Later authenticated Linux Gateway evidence exported 14 paths with zero missing/errors. The review rehashes existing pure checks and verifies the five publication/address/mapping functions are unchanged through final source. These records satisfy the scoped integrity and console criterion; no second-boot or instruction-cache claim is made.
DD29: firmware/USB defect and physical cases closed
The same independent reviewer recommends CLOSED_VERIFIED in
independent/dd29-mixed-evidence-closure-review-719043fad-01/review.json, SHA-256
2b2788b075ced4ac8e26fadd53977abea1deada8edf2b29625a899b85bcbe750.
Six relevant files are unchanged from the independently reviewed implementation
through 61f7bcd1f and 719043fad. The acquired Queen log shows firmware
notification, completion and the 20 ms hardware wait, complete proof, keyboard
enumeration, first HID report and command readiness with no pending recovery.
No typed physical key is inferred from those machine observations.
Lukas Bower explicitly confirmed: “Keyboard absent has been tested and confirmed
by me.” The exact statement is retained in
validation/post-burn-in-stage5-check-20260913T100408Z/keyboard-absent-human-attestation.json.
This is HUMAN-ATTESTED physical testing. Its image, test time and machine log
are unspecified; none is invented. The finding requires present and absent
physical cases without mandating a machine transcript for absence. The two
stated evidence bases satisfy that scoped criterion. No repeat is required,
and no same-image absence capture or full repeatability matrix is claimed.
Remaining blockers and retained checks
DD28 remains OPEN: the complete 61f7bcd1f GENET reset/firmware receipt and
network work are available, but same-image WiFi boot/network proof is missing.
DD30 remains OPEN: normal Worker lifecycle and maintenance policy refusals do
not supply restricted critical-TCB kernel-error/fault/wake proof. The automated
cybersecurity stop described above still supplies no execution evidence and
was not retried. These are the remaining P1 blockers; keyboard absence and
human Rust approval are resolved.
timeline-merge-checks/results.json under the burn-in root records PASS for
all eight required checks on 719043fad: format, Clippy, workspace check/test,
audit, deny advisories, generated consistency and Test Plan integrity.
human-review-signoff.json records Lukas Bower’s approval of all six burn-in
fixes; earlier Stage 5 fixes were also approved. publication-result.json
records their push to main through 719043fad. The current user reconfirmed
approval of all fixes. Approval and source publication are complete.
The current focused assessment is
validation/post-burn-in-stage5-check-20260913T100408Z. It retains the initial
four-finding predicate result, the passing exception register check, current
evidence hashes and the subsequent two-finding closure update. Only affected
audit metadata, generated consistency, Test Plan integrity and diff/link checks
are selected for this documentation update. Existing full-source checks are
reused. No Stage 05 PASS marker or final release claim is emitted.
Changes are confined to the findings register and its audit/checklist consumers. The complete host-tool suite, Python SDK, generated runtime interfaces and performance benchmark surfaces were reviewed for compatibility: no behavior, schema, ABI, workload or implementation changes are needed for this record update.
Stage 05 predicate repair and audit-update checks
The findings predicate previously deferred an open P1 whose target_date
was in the future. That would exclude DD30 until its due date, contradicting
Section 10 of the due-diligence plan. The gate now blocks every unclosed
P0/P1 regardless of that scheduling date; severity, dates and exceptions are
unchanged. The focused --check-blocking-findings entry point exercises the
same predicate as Stage 05. Deterministic lifecycle regressions cover past,
future, absent and malformed dates, selected unclosed dispositions, verified
closures and the separate P2 lifecycle boundary.
This audit/gate delta changes no host-tool, Python SDK, generated runtime contract, benchmark workload, report schema, ABI or runtime behavior. Those complete surface groups were reviewed; none requires an implementation change here. The local audit-update record retains the patch, source identity and exact commands for focused lifecycle tests, shell syntax, register validation, generated-contract/Test Plan checks and diff validation. No broad host or target suite was selected for this audit/gate repair. The new report is admitted by regenerating the compiler-owned source inventory and dependent host-integration digest. The first generated check’s missing inventory entry remains recorded separately from the corrected result.
Final finding closure and release-owner decision
Title/ID: stage5-final-findings-and-owner-waiver. Milestone: M26e
m26e-driver-runtime-mcs-port-and-cyw43-coexistence, discovered during
m26e-mcs-smp-target-acceptance, including its explicit release 1.0.0-beta
DD30 owner-decision restoration task. Goal: close DD28 using independent
same-image physical evidence and apply the owner’s narrowly scoped DD30
acceptance without inventing dynamic test results or altering source provenance.
DD28: same-image WiFi and GENET proof closed
The fresh WiFi evidence is
completion-20260913T102047Z/dd28-wifi-01. The canonical U-Boot/TFTP RAM loader
completed all three transfer and post-reset CRC checks, then booted the same
61f7bcd1f057277151b46e884339076a7e49bb59 implementation and image used for the
completed GENET evidence. Image SHA-256 is
5f3457c2a0798ec28bca7f7511b90e8eeb7eb628f43844823939d3661a9aacbf; image ID is
9643bd91cf1cb7a071d5d2525f2b58ca50695e70088b4b000dbf01b8f034c6cc.
After the passive settle, the first raw WiFi workload passed all 64 requests
without retry/reconnect: 40.541 requests/s and p95 33.862 ms against the
unchanged WiFi thresholds. The subsequent authenticated Queen-log collection
completed AUTH/ATTACH/CAT/END/QUIT/EOF with 1379 body frames and 160446 bytes,
then the separate serial probe returned PONG. Both en0/en8 packet intervals
are retained and hashed in packet-capture-binding.json.
Independent review
independent/dd28-dual-mode-evidence-review-6d7c16e4a-01/review.json, SHA-256
b23918dd37a5049a5006db8d1670f053dc5acf490cec20cb167d5ea61ff069f7, rehashes
49 inputs, validates the image and root-text cuts, retained reset/wait/completion
proof, both network lanes, raw results, real CAT frames and EOF, and serial
liveness. Aggregate complete-proof records and unchanged fail-closed source
establish the scoped PCIe checks; unretained register values are not invented.
The recommendation is DD28 CLOSED_VERIFIED. RAM-loader elapsed time is not
ordinary SD boot timing, and this finding closure makes no new SD-delivery,
boot-time, second-boot or full repeatability claim.
DD30: owner accepts the unexecuted dynamic test
Lukas Bower explicitly stated: “There is no debugger, dd30 was a one-off issue.
Mark it as a pass, we are ready for release”. The exact statement is retained
in completion-20260913T102047Z/dd30-release-owner-decision.json and the tracked
DD30_RELEASE_WAIVER.toml. It accepts the remaining
fault/wake evidence gap for this release. DD30 remains P1 / ACCEPTED_RISK;
its verified-closure date and closure evidence remain empty. The target test
is UNEXECUTED, not a passing dynamic test.
Source, selected ABI, pure-test and emitted-code review of the IPC repair
remain available. The current review is
independent/dd30-current-evidence-review-6d7c16e4a-01/review.json, SHA-256
97aa61923ad311221b7eb558f07a13474fba7cfc11c1825608165f728befb443.
The same directory’s physical-pi-capability-gap.json, SHA-256
ac8fbbb9df0378951f1eefce74bca40c8dd97398176037539a1bb23cc914a4fb, distinguishes
ordinary root-control Worker shutdown and maintenance policy refusals from a
restricted kernel fault. There is no supported serial/TCP fault-injection
command, U-Boot cannot fault a running seL4 task, and the user confirms no
debugger is connected. The earlier diagnostic stopped by automatic approval
review was not repeated or bypassed.
EX-2026-0030 is specific to 1.0.0-beta and
dd30-restricted-ipc-dynamic-fault-wake. Its conservative administrative expiry
is 2026-10-13, aligned to the current release qualification window; the owner
did not supply an expiry date for this waiver. The validator requires the exact
approval, matching finding and exception records, owner, release, dates and
active status, and all ten protected production-file hashes at the original
reviewed commit. Current files must match those hashes or the exact separately
approved host-only successor described below. Explicit DD_RELEASE_ID=1.0.0-beta is
required for release admission. Missing, changed, withdrawn, expired or
out-of-scope approval fails closed. P0 and every other unclosed P1 remain
blocking; this DD30 decision changes no runtime, severity or threshold. The
separate carry-forward decision below owns the staged provenance exception.
Earlier current-source qualification plan (superseded by owner approval below)
The source-context audit is
independent/stage5-current-source-reuse-6d7c16e4a-01/review.json, SHA-256
049e05e6c071114439dde87d3c26456115dd8be26b79a49ce09df9f3eaa4c6e6.
It finds no accepted current-source Stage 01–04 chain. The retained
stage5-closure-22e3d08ffb5d-01 chain remains valid historical evidence, but
canonical verification rejects its changed source/input context. Material IPC,
Worker maintenance and host FUSE/policy changes followed that chain. Therefore
fresh canonical stages on the final clean commit are necessary; no marker is
copied, source hash rewritten, or reuse predicate relaxed. The completed
burn-in and human keyboard-absence evidence are preserved without repetition.
The final invocation uses the Mac qemu_smp_production profile, its selected
seL4 output, the pinned HVF QEMU executable, and explicit release context:
scripts/ci/test_plan_run.sh --list
DD_RELEASE_ID=1.0.0-beta scripts/ci/test_plan_run.sh --target qemu --state-dir out/test-plan/<final-source-run>
The canonical run will retain immutable evidence under
completion-20260913T102047Z/validation/, including the
exact clean commit, complete environment selection with secrets omitted,
commands, stage attestations and final verdict. A Stage 05 PASS is valid only
when that canonical run actually completes; it denotes release acceptance
with this disclosed residual risk, not execution of the waived test.
Changes, checks and compatibility
The atomic change updates the findings/exception records, waiver, canonical
milestone/Test Plan/audit policy and their checklist consumers. A shared
lifecycle validator preserves the focused and full due-diligence gate paths,
with deterministic regressions for ordinary lifecycle rules and the narrow
waiver’s invalidation cases. Focused lifecycle tests, shell syntax and exception/blocker checks (including
wrong or absent release selection) are retained in
validation/dd30-release-waiver-lifecycle-01. Compiler regeneration, generated
consistency, Test Plan integrity and metadata/diff/link checks are retained in
completion-20260913T102047Z/checks. The
compiler regenerates its source inventory and dependent integration digest;
generated files are not hand-edited.
The complete host-tool suite, tools/cohesix-py library, runtime interfaces,
performance harnesses, workloads and report schemas were reviewed for
compatibility. This governance change adds no runtime, API, ABI, namespace,
policy-default, workload or benchmark-schema change; those implementations
require no edits. The audit disposition vocabulary is unchanged. The new
release-waiver record is consumed only by the canonical due-diligence gate.
No Rust implementation is changed, and prior approved Rust/source checks
remain preserved with their exact provenance.
Approved carry-forward and host-only compatibility repair
Title/ID: stage5-release-owner-carry-forward-host-model. Milestone and discovery
remain the active M26e restoration tasks stated above, with the explicit approved
carry-forward task in BUILD_PLAN. Goal: complete release Stage 05 without
repeating completed suites, preserving authentic predecessor identities and the
reviewed exact host-only repair. Inputs are the four original 22e3d08ff
attestations, later scoped fix/target/burn-in receipts, source aeaa8edb2, the
reviewed two-file patch and Lukas Bower’s subsequent explicit approval.
The fresh aeaa8edb2 attempt completed workspace, UI, QEMU-feature and preceding
host checks, then failed in the Pi host-feature suite. The first failure was
cyw43_supervisor_drives_production_pair_restart_one_operation_per_outer_turn.
The host CallWithMRs fixture echoes its request label; the repaired object
wrapper interpreted the Suspend request label 11 as an error. The assertion
panic left recovery state active and poisoned the module lock, producing a
cascade and a later deadline-test loop whose guard counted only admitted turns.
The initial standalone failure, isolated deadline/group controls, ordered
predecessor diagnosis and process sample are retained under
completion-20260913T102047Z/checks. The owned stalled host-test process was
terminated; its original failed canonical attempt remains unchanged.
Independent causal review is
independent/pi-feature-host-suspend-causal-review-aeaa8ed-01/review.json, SHA-256
11d2e85c371437a519bea49768c7887199ac7c8ed35b9160835887d7b469c0e5.
The two-file repair changes only the typed host object model in sel4.rs and
the deadline fixture in event/mod.rs. The four typed host operations use their
existing models; unknown endpoint labels still echo. The target fast-register
call is unchanged. The fixture enforces its existing admitted/outer-turn
relationship on every iteration, retaining the 25 ms and 192-turn limits.
No recovery condition is cleared merely to make a test pass.
Independent source review
completion-20260913T102047Z/independent-review/host-kernel-object-model-01/review.json,
SHA-256 31f84049561cabce88182450be0e977838eeb9adc17b7728701beeb6fd652cf2,
verifies the normalized target helper is identical and the event production
prefix is byte-identical. Patch SHA-256 is
54c1ea4bc418b41400c450f47de8e354c3c21aa5e4181748602fb6bfdf85a738.
The previously failed Pi host-feature suite then passed all 2388 tests with
zero failures. The repaired crate’s normal-profile Clippy, formatting and Rust
risk gate passed. An additional noncanonical feature-Clippy exploration emitted
487 diagnostics at unchanged sites; its failure is retained separately, and
unrelated feature-lint cleanup was not added to the release task. No completed
workspace or UI suite was repeated after the no-duplicate instruction.
Lukas Bower approved the exact review packet and answered “Approved”. The
immutable decision is
completion-20260913T102047Z/release-carry-forward-review/owner-approval.json,
SHA-256 009fdb80aaf6be0206636bd5886337bcbc9d84101260a3521e7afaa44f2befc1.
The packet approves the Rust repair, release-only reuse of original Stage 01–04
records plus later scoped fix evidence, and the exact DD30 successor binding.
RELEASE_1_0_0_BETA_CARRY_FORWARD.toml
binds that decision, proposal, independent review, original attestation/context
hashes, the closure-file scope and 18 named later evidence records. Their exact
hashes and original verdicts are required, including the timed burn-in failure
and DD30’s partial proof; final review receipts cannot replace them. Its expiry is the conservative existing
2026-10-13 administrative limit. The original DD30 decision and protected
hashes remain intact; the single host-only successor is checked explicitly.
The dedicated scripts/ci/release_stage5_acceptance.py path validates the
immutable predecessor graph and exact clean final source, checks current unique
governance, and emits release-stage5-acceptance.json with
PASS_WITH_RESIDUAL_RISK only on actual success. It creates no replacement
Stage 01–04 .done files and does not disable the ordinary current-context
verifier. Current cargo audit and cargo deny check advisories both passed
at 11:23 UTC; receipts under completion-20260913T102047Z/unique-stage5-governance
retain their exact successful commands and logs for this same acceptance
operation, with Cargo.lock and tool bindings required before reuse.
The accepted residual risks are the unexecuted DD30 dynamic fault/wake test and the missing complete current-source Stage 01–04 chain. The original records, failed attempts and evidence authorities stay visible. Release-bundle source and content integrity, delivered media, other target proof and performance thresholds remain outside this waiver. A separate packaging task owns release artifacts and documentation; this closure does not relabel its inputs.
Compatibility review covers the complete host-tool suite, Python SDK and performance harnesses: no public API, namespace, ABI, operator workflow, benchmark workload or result-schema change is needed. Only the host test model, test failure behavior and explicit release-governance workflow change. The compiler-owned outputs retain their authoritative generation procedure.
DD30 retirement decision (2026-09-14)
Lukas Bower approved the recommendation to retire DD30’s recurring milestone and release approvals by stating: “Proceed with your recommendation”. The recommendation explicitly retained the repaired defect’s history and the unexecuted dynamic fault/wake test, removed DD30 expiry and source-fingerprint renewals, and preserved ordinary IPC review and regression coverage. The later instruction “Let’s not rely on a gdb test, disregard” withdrew the proposed gap test. This decision requires no new target test.
DD-2026-0030 retains severity P1 and now has terminal disposition
RETIRED_ACCEPTED_GAP. EX-2026-0030 is RETIRED, with no expiry. This is an
owner-approved retirement of the repaired historical finding with an accepted
verification gap; it is not CLOSED_VERIFIED. Its commit_sha identifies the
repair, closed_date records this retirement decision, and closure_evidence
points here. Dynamic fault/wake remains UNEXECUTED. No historical test,
attestation, failed run or milestone task is changed by this decision.
Preserved history and controls
The M26e Stage 05 review under m26e-mcs-smp-target-acceptance discovered the
defect; m26e-driver-runtime-mcs-port-and-cyw43-coexistence owned its repair.
Commit 3746e659f
recorded and repaired notification/error writes through root’s shared IPC
pointer and safe wrappers accepting unchecked output storage.
ROLES_AND_SCHEDULING.md retains the caller-owned
storage and borrowed-output contracts. Existing sel4-sys storage regressions
and root-task MCS fault-lane tests remain required when those contracts change.
The 13 September audit records the source, ABI, pure-test and emitted-code reviews and missing target proof. The original release waiver, M27 approval, and M27a approval remain unchanged historical records. Their DD30 expiry and whole-file hashes no longer govern future acceptance. This supersedes their DD30 renewal conditions and earlier DD30 blocker wording, including the historical build-plan requirement for fault/wake evidence before verified closure. It grants retirement with an accepted gap, not that closure.
Ordinary review still applies to IPC ownership changes. A demonstrated
regression uses the normal OPEN finding lifecycle; retirement cannot admit an
open defect. Other P0/P1 findings cannot use this disposition. General Rust
review, risk-ratchet exceptions, target evidence and staged qualification remain
required by their owning policies. The separate release-only
Stage 01–04 carry-forward retains its
original scope, source bindings and expiry.
Focused governance checks
python3 -m unittest discover -s scripts/ci -p test_due_diligence_lifecycle.py
cargo test -p tests --test audit_ledgers
scripts/ci/due_diligence_gate.sh --check-blocking-findings docs/audit/findings.csv docs/audit/EXCEPTIONS.md
scripts/ci/due_diligence_gate.sh --check-exceptions-register docs/audit/findings.csv docs/audit/EXCEPTIONS.md
scripts/ci/due_diligence_gate.sh --check-rust-review 27a
scripts/check-generated.sh
Finding checks need no milestone or release selection. DD_MILESTONE_ID is
obsolete. The explicit --check-rust-review 27|27a command independently checks
the corresponding historical Rust approval against its reviewed implementation;
it neither expires with DD30 nor approves new source. Future Rust reviews follow
the normal contribution workflow and need no DD30 approval file. Passing a
finding preflight alone never establishes human Rust review or Stage 05 PASS.
The lifecycle tests cover retirement beyond the old expiry, source changes without renewed DD30 approval, retained gap reporting, malformed/missing retirement records, rejection of other P0/P1 findings and reopened DD30, and separate Rust-review source validation. These are governance tests, not target fault/wake evidence. Existing waiver-window tests are superseded because the owner has retired that policy; generic exception tests remain.
Compatibility review: the host-tool suite (coh, cohsh, Hive Gateway,
SwarmUI, host-ticket-agent, gpu-bridge-host and CAS tools), Python SDK, compiler
manifests and benchmark workloads need no changes. Their runtime interfaces,
source/target provenance and report schemas are unchanged. Historical release
acceptance keeps dd30_dynamic_fault_wake=NOT_EXECUTED.